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Damage control : Media representation and responses to police deviance
Abstract
This paper examines the processes and outcomes of the negotiation of public discourse between the
police and the media when police organisations are called to account in public scandals. Using the 1992
television documentary Cop It Sweet as a case study, the paper describes the problems of police/
Aborigines relations exposed in the film, the reaction within the police hierarchy, the attempt at damage
control and the subsequent repair work carried out in tenns of improving police/minority relations. The
role of the media as an agent of criminal justice reform and a mechanism for demanding police
accountability is discussed in this context. It will be argued that scandals force police organisations to
provide a credible account that deviance is under control. The consequences of scandals depend on the
nature of the police organisation and its commitment to reform. Public discourse in relation to police
deviance may provide an opportunity for police reformers to further their reform agenda, but in an
organisation less committed to change, there is a danger that scapegoating, band-aid repair work and
cosmetic changes may substitute for meaningful reform. The irony of police reform is that commitment
to openness and accountability does not necessarily lead to a positive police image, but continual
damage-control work by upper management in relation to scandals may lead to further cynicism and a
hardening of the 'street cop' culture.
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DAMAGE CONTROL:
MEDIA REPRESENTATION AND
RESPONSES TO POLICE DEVIANCE
ja net Chan *

ABSTRACT
his paper examines the proce~ses and outcomes of the negotiation
of public discourse between the police and the media when police
organisations are called to account in public scandals. Using the
1992 television documentary Cop It Sweet as a case study, the paper
describes the problems of police/Aborigines relations exposed in the film,
the reaction within the police hierarchy, the attempt at damage control and
the subsequent repair work carried out in tenns of improving police/minority
relations. The role of the media as an agent of criminal justice refoon and a
mechanism for demanding police accountability is discussed in this context.
It will be argued that scandals force police organisations to provide a credible
account that deviance is under control. The consequences of scandals depend
on the nature of the police organisation and its commitment to refonn. Public
discourse in relation to police deviance may provide an opportunity for
police refonners to further their reform agenda, but in an organisation less
committed to change, there is a danger that scapegoating, band-aid repair
work and cosmetic changes may substitute for meaningful refonn-. The irony
of police refonh is that commitment to openness and accountability does not
necessarily lead to a positive police image, but continual damage-control
work by upper management in relation to scandals may lead to further
cynicism and a hardening of the 'street cop' culture.

T

INTRODUCTION: MEDIA AND POLICING
The criminological literature has long documented the role of the media
as a generator or amplifier of 'moral panics' regarding crime and deviance
(e.g. Cohen 1972; Hall et al 1978). This literature highlights the processes
engaged in by the media in the social construction of deviance. In general,
research in this tradition has focused on what is conventionally known as
'street crimes' or violent crimes (see, for example, Fishman 1978;
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Voumvakis and Ericson 1984). More recently, researchers have argued that,
in fact, 'deviance is the defining characteristic of what journalists regard as
newsworthy and, as such, becomes inextricably linked with journalists'
method' (Ericson et al 1987:4). Media workers do not simply concentrate on
street crimes and violence, they are engaged in the policing of all fonns
organisational life (Reiss 1983), especially that of public institutions.
Organisational deviance in the fonn of corruption, procedural irregularities,
or unfair practices is as much a preoccupation of the media as individual
deviance, especially among the 'quality' media outlets which take seriously
their 'fourth estate' function (see Ericson et alI989). The important role of
the media as an active agent ofcriminal justice reform is an area that has not
been adequately explored and analysed in criminological research (see also
Fisse and Braithwaite 1983).
The significance of the media's role as an agent of reform lies in the
power of the public discourse of deviance and control they help in
generating. By painting a picture of deviance, corruption or injustice, media
stories contribute to the sense of urgency regarding the need for action to
combat such corrupt or unjust practices. But the media are not alone in this
enterprise of moral crusading - the public discourse is a product of
negotiation between media workers and information sources (Ericson et al
1989). Organisations whose deviance is being exposed are capable of, and
are routinely engaged in, shaping and developing this public discourse to
minimise damage to the organisational image, as well as to project a sense of
order and control by reporting on remedial actions being undertaken to
rectify the problem. However, not all media workers are concerned with
moral crusades, and not all members of the organisation being reported on
are concerned with damage control.
The focus of this study is the interaction between the police and the
media. Police researchers have suggested that there is a fundamental division
between the 'street cop culture' and the 'management cop culture' within the
police organisation (Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983):
The cop culture is oriented to the policeman's lot, providing
recipe knowledge about how to recognise problems and
take decisions without getting into trouble. The
management culture is oriented to the public culture,
dealing in indicators of police performance, especially
efficiency in crime control (Ericson et al 1989: I11).
In their ethnographic research into the news media, Ericson et al (1989)
find that there is a similar split between the two cultures of police reporters:
the 'inner circle' reporters who typically work for popular media outlets and
who are trusted by the police to carry stories which are more likely to
enhance the popular image of the police, and the 'outer circle' reporters who
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typically work for quality media outlets and who are prepared to engage in
'investigative reporting' and present stories which expose deviant police
practices. Ericson et al (1989) argue that while inner circle reporters orient
their work to both the street cop and the management cop culture, outer circle
reporters are primarily oriented to the management cop culture:
It is arguable that [outer circle reporters'] emphasis on
police propriety and efficiency through the portrayal of
deviance served in the long run to enhance police
management. The typical response to police malfeasance is
to demand more resources in the form of more laws or
rules, more equipment, and more personnel. ... In the long
run and in the aggregate, outer-circle reporters contribute to _
this refonn politics on behalf of police-management. They
actually join with the police management culture in the
policing of efficiency and propriety ... (Ericson et al
1989: 113-114).
Typically, police forces seek to enhance their organisational image by
having specialised media units in charge of providing infonnation to the
media. In large police forces, however, there is a recognition that authorised
police officers in other units should be able to gi ve factual information to the
media in matters of public interest. The areas of 'enclosure' and "disclosure'
are carefully guarded, so that 'confidence' ~ 'secrecy', 'publicity' and
'censorship' are judiciously employed (Ericson et al 1989:9). Nevertheless,
large police organisations are porous, with numerous sources of infonnation
available to journalists, so that it is not always possible to 'patrol the facts'
nor to avoid negative publicity. Ironically, when police deviance becomes a
major public issue through media coverage, police organisations must seek
access to the media to effect damage control.
Public scandals also require substantial repair work within police
organisations. Since scandals threaten to expose organisational weaknesses
and reveal systemic abuses, organisational representatives must
'energetically \seek to restore and bolster up the myth system' (Punch
1985:7). They do so by 'attempting to minimise the issue, by claiming that
it is an aberration caused by a few individuals, and [by seeking] scapegoats',
while critics may insist that it was not a matter of a few 'rotten apples', but
a 'rotten basket' (Punch 1985:15; Sherman 1978). Police organisations are
more likely to be successful in this negotiation of public image if they can
demonstrate their ability to control themselves. The adoption of immediate
and visible reforms is essential:
To be successful refonn may require that h.eads will roll,
that chiefs and senior personnel be removed and replaced,
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that a new style of control be implemented, that opportunity
structures and enforcement patterns be altered, and that new
nonns and values be broadcast internally and externally as
a reassurance that police behaviour will be changed (Punch
1985:16).
Scandals can also precipitate further fractions and divisions within the
organisation. Management may attempt to locate the problems at a lower
level, while rank-and-file officers may resist this scapegoating by pushing
the blame upwards (Ibid:?). The traditional solidarity and secrecy of police
culture break. down under the strain of external scrutiny and official
investigations (Ibid:121-122).
In spite of the significance of public scandals in generating demands for
police reform, few studies of media representation and responses to police
deviance are found in the literature. In this paper, the broadcasting of a
television documentary on police/Aborigines relations in Sydney is used as
a case study of the negotiation of public discourse by the police and the
media in relation to police racism. The documentary, a graphic illustration of
racist police behaviour in a patrol with a heavy concentration of Aboriginal
people, sparked strong reactions both within and outside of the police force
and led to a number of reforms being undertaken as a corrective measure.
The paper will attempt to answer the following questions:
• In what way does the media engage in the processes of criminal
justice reforms?
• How do police organisations negotiate the public discourse to
control damageto their image?
• What are the consequences of these negotiations?
I will fIrst describe the problems of police/Aborigines relations exposed
in the film, the reaction within the police hierarchy, the attempt at damage
control and the subsequent repair work carried out to improve
police/minority relations. The role of the media as an agent of criminal
justice refonn and a mechanism for demanding police accountability is
examined in this context. It will be argued that scandals force police
organisations to provide a credible account that deviance is under control.
The consequences of media scandals depend on the nature of the police
organisation and its commitment to reform. Public discourse in relation to
police deviance may provide an opportunity for police reformers to further
their reform agenda, but in an organisation less committed to change, there
is a danger that scapegoating, band-aid repair work and cosmetic changes
may substitute for meaningful reform.

COP IT SWEET: POLICE/ABORIGINES
RELATIONS IN REDFERN
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In 1992, the ABC screened a controversial television documentary Cop
It Sweet, a film about the reality of policing in the Sydney inner city area of
Redfern. The film depicted police work in one of the most socially
disadvantaged areas of Sydney which has a high concentration of
Aborigines. The documentary was filmed over a six-week period in Redfern
by freelance journalist Jenny Brockie with police permission at a 'senior
command level' (NSW Police Board 1992: 17). The content of the
documentary was based on a collage of police work in this inner city area
which has been well known in recent years as a site of tension between the
police and the Aboriginal community. One account of the documentary
neatly summarises the images presented:
Cop It Sweet ... was a shocking account of six weeks in the
life of the Redfern police ... [T]hese real-life coppers
artlessly revealed the bovine obstinacy and banal prejudice
that sustains hostilities with the Aboriginal community ...
They spoke automatically .of 'coons' and 'gooks' and pubs
'full of lesbians'. Asked to explain what he meant by a
'suss' car, one policeman suggested a red Laser with an
Aborigine driving it. '... These ludicrously young officers,
who were sharp enough to sense that what they learned at
the police academy was 'bull--', knew nothing about the
people they were policing and were unable or unwilling to
find out. As one officer remarked: 'I really don't stop and
talk to them that much, to tell you the truth.' ... Towards the
end of the program the police found a young Aboriginal
man swearing on a street corner. [The man was
subsequently arrested.] ... Back at the station, the man
demanded to know what he had done. 'You swore,' said the
policeman. 'You're kidding,' said the man incredulously. In
the preceding hour, most of the obscene language had come
from the police. In other circumstances it might have been
comic. Here, it was almost harrowing. The Aboriginal man
. .. seethed with frustration and disbelief. ." (Sydney
Morning Herald, 'Phoenix rises, but in Redfern police
credibility lies in ashes', 7 March 1992).
Even though it lacked the sensational and emotive quality of the video
footage showing the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles Police, Cop It
Sweet sent shock waves through the New South Wales police bureaucracy
and the Australian community, confronting police officers with an aspect of
their occupation and ordinary citizens with a view of their justice system that
both groups would rather forget. The message was crude and
uncompromising: the officers depicted were racist, sexist, ignorant,
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insensitive and hypocritical, even though it was clear to the viewers that they
were inexperienced officers working under extremely difficult conditions.
But the film also raised a number of disturbing questions about the goals of
policing, the quality of police training and supervision, the justice of the
criminal law, and the culture of racism in Australian society.
Most significant of all, the film revealed a disturbing side of what has
often been referred to in the academic literature as the police occupational
culture (Skolnick 1966; Manning 1977). Police culture is situated in the
'back region' of police organisation, rarely disclosed to the outside world
(Ericson et al 1989). Most of the academic accounts of police culture were
based on observational studies of street-level police work. What the
producers of Cop It Sweet managed to do was to make aspects of this culture
visible to the public in a way that called police executives to account. The
film maker's own description of what she discovered echoed many of the
research findings:
My experience of general duties police is that they feel
misunderstood, undervalued and constantly under siege
from politicians, the media, welfare groups and their own
bureaucracy. All this as they daily ricochet from the boring
to the volatile, the trivial to the life-threatening. '" The
police I met did feel separate from, rather than part of, the
broader community. It had driven many of them to a siege
mentality - the 'us and them' syndrome ... Racist language,
was, at the very least, tolerated among police, though there
was an awareness there'd be trouble if it was revealed to the
world outside. But that was a question of tactics. Keeping it
in house was what mattered. Keeping the lid on things.
Always keeping the lid on things (Brockie 1994:177-178).
Instead of worrying about the racist language they used, police officers
were more concerned about whether or not they were wearing their hats
when the cameras were rolling. This was because 'they knew what was
important to their bosses' - a knowledge subsequently validated by a senior
police official's remark on the 'standard of the officers' dress' shown in the
documentary (Brockie 1994:178; cf Van Maanen 1983).
For practitioners and analysts of the criminal justice system, the
documentary offered nothing new or shocking. Relations between
Aborigines and police at Redfern have been a problem for at least twenty
years (Cunneen 1990). Among the problems documented in the late 1960s
and early 1970s were the complaints that Aborigines were regularly arrested
without cause and were subjected to a police-imposed. curfew.
Aborigines/police relations did not improve in the 19708 and 19805.
Constant complaints were made regarding police harassment and bashing of
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Aborigines, plus numerous 'large-scale police incursions' into Redfern
involving the use of riot police on several occasions (Cunneen 1990; Landa
Report 1991). Indeed, the treatment of Aborigines by the crimfnal justice
system throughout Australia has been the subject of numerous research
studies, all of which highlighted policing as the most problematic stage of
the criminal justice process (e.g. Luke and Cunneen 1992; Cunneen and
Robb 1987; Gale et al 1990). In a way, Australia is no different from other
Western countries such as Britain, Canada and the United States, where
similar problems and conflict exist between the police and visible racial
minorities. In Britain and the United States, racial tension and hostility have
led to the eruption of major urban riots (Scarman Report 1981; Skolnick and
Fyfe 1993). Minorities have complained of police prejudice, discriminatory
law enforcement practices, violation of civil rights and even racially
motivated violence. Police blame minorities for uncooperative attitudes,
disproportionate involvement in criminal conduct; and ignorance or
disrespect for the legal system. Some of the problems, such as those between
the police and the indigenous people, are the results of centuries of
colonisation and social deprivation. Others, such as those between the police
and immigrants from non-English speaking countries, are ostensibly related
to language and cultural differen~es.
What the documentary uncovered, therefore, could not have been all that
surprising to members of the police force. Yet it was a picture of police work
at great variance with the organisation's rhetoric of community policing,
non-discriminatory practices and professionalism. It was this gap that
required explanation. It was the damage done to the credibility of the
organisation that required control. Even though none of the activities
portrayed in the documentary would have been classified as illegal, the need
for damage control was no less urgent. In this way, the media was more
effective than the law in demanding accountability from the police.
The significance of Cop it Sweet, then, was not so much that it said
anything new about police race relations, but that it raised serious questions
about the effectiveness of police refonns. Even thQugh many New South
Wales police officers publiciy expressed abhorrence and disgust at the
behaviours of their colleagues, and vehemently dissociated themselves from
the image conveyed by the documentary, critics of the police saw the film as
a scathing indictment of police racism and a vindication of their longstanding criticisms of police practices in Aboriginal communities. Some
blame the wider Australian culture as the basis for racist attitudes among
police officers. Others were impatient with the lack of progress in police
refonus, advocating immediate actions and more drastic measures to be
taken. The irony of this public indictment of the New South Wales Police is
that it came at a time when the Police Service had been undergoing some
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major organisational and cultural reforms over several years. In 1984, a new
Commissioner was appointed to the NSW Police Force. John Avery's
mission was to rid the force of its corrupt image and open the door to a new
police culture in which service to the community - including Aboriginal
and other visible racial minority communities - is a major motivation for
police work. Many sweeping administrative changes were introduced by the
Avery administration, including a complete reorganisation of the command
structure, and the introduction of a merit-based promotion policy. Some of
these changes dealt a heavy blow on the corrupt elements of the force and
paved the way for more lasting reforms of the police organisation. Other
changes such as the implementation of new recruitment and training policies
were to consolidate the refonn process by producing a new generation of
police officers more responsive to the needs of the community. Some
initiatives were specifically aimed at improving police/visible minority
relations; others were simply blanket reforms for building a more
professional, accountable and open police force (see Chan 1992). In terms of
improving police/Aborigines relations, there have been an impressive list of
positive achievements, including the appointment of an Aboriginal Client
Consultant and Aboriginal community liaison officers, the establishment of
Aboriginal community consultative committees, the introduction of a
bridging course for Aboriginal people to increase their educational level to
qualify for entry into the police force, the development of training
programmes for Aboriginal community liaison officers and cultural
awareness programmes for patrols, and the development of Aboriginal
Studies curriculum for training of recruits (Crawford 1992:10). Cop It Sweet
was not only embarrassing to the police administration , it revealed
devastating evidence that eight years of police reform has changed little on
the streets of Redfern.

NEGOTIATING THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE
In spite of the predictability of its content to police researchers, when the
highest ranking executives of the Police Service viewed Cop It Sweet for the
first time, it was reported that they 'nearly fell off their chairs' in amazement
(Chan 1992). Media and public reaction to the documentary were also
unusually strong. Part of the explanation for this reaction may be that
television images are powerful and convincing:
The visual capacity of television allows it to bind its
messages to the context in which they were produced ...
The greater the capacity to bind messages to context, the
greater the validation powers of the medium. Television
appears most valid because statements made by its sources
can be contextualized in the real places in which they were
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made.... Television's capacity to bind messages to context
and thereby validate its messages accounts for the fact that
survey research in Canada, Britain and the United States
consistently show that readers find television news more
believable, fair, and influential than radio or newspapers ...
(Ericson et al 1991:23-24).
Viewers may have read or heard about the problems of police!Aborigines
relations in Redfern, but television allows them to see the problems as if they
were there. Police managers do not directly supervise or control the work of
line officers; they rely on written and verbal accounts provided by these
officers to infonn them of what goes on in the streets. The television images
are thus particularly revealing, and where there are clear breaches of rules or
regulations, extremely embarrassing for the organisation. Another reason for
the public outrage has to do with what is not shown. As one analyst of the
film medium points out,
Cinema is an art and a medium of extensions and index.es. Much
of its meaning comes not from what we see (or hear) but from
what we don't see or, more accurately, from an ongoing process
of comparison of what we see with what we don't see (Monaco
1981:136-7}.
Viewers of Cop It Sweet could well imagine the likely behaviour of these
police officers if the television camera had not been present. As a letter
writer to the Sydney Morning Herald states, 'What is most frightening about
the actions of the officers shown in the program is that they are those of the
police on their best behaviour for the cameras' (SMH Letters 7 March 1992).
Of course, not all reactions to the documentary were hostile to the police.
One Jetter writer complained of 'journalistic manipulation of the issues' and
'public blind spot to Aboriginal lawlessness' (SMH Letters 7 March 1992).
Another supported the police who 'work day to day with racial tension,
drunkenness and violence' and defended the officers' swearing and racist
comments as 'ways of coping' with their work (SMH Letters 7 March 1992).
As Ericsol). et al (1989) point out, police organisations have in recent
years recognised the importance of co-operating with the media as a way of
sustaining the organisation's image of being open and accountable:
The police have become relatively more open. Unlike the
courts, they often have full-time public-relations specialists
and news-media officers who are proactive in
disseminating knowledge and arranging for 'media events.'
While this aspect of openness may be taken as a sign that
efforts are being made to exen more control over the news
media, it is also a sign that the police recognize the need to
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be more open and accommodative to perpetual demands for
news-media coverage ... In the face of being used at the
forefront of public debates about the relation between the
individual and the state, and as a sign of governmental
accountability, the police recognize the importance of
allowing reasonable access to the news media and the
account ability allowed by its discourse (Brogden, 1982;
Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984; Reiner, 1985). ..,(Ericson
et aI 1989:11).
Proactive media strategies can, in the long term, protect the organisation
from its environment and enhance the organisation's legitimacy. When the
organisation is under attack, as in this case, a proactive approach is important
for containing the damage done to its image. According to senior police
officers, the State Executive Group had an opportunity to watch Cop It Sweet
one week before it was broadcast. A 'damage control' meeting was called
and senior representatives of operational, policy, and disciplinary branches
got together to discuss ways of responding. The damage control operation
was well orchestrated and professionally executed:

I think firstly that there was genuine concern of what had
happened from the Commissioner down and that certainly
wasn't affected or put on. The issue was that, as there
always is in these situations, you need to do something and
you need to be seen to be doing something.... I think
another standard ap-proach in damage control is to stress the
positive. ... The critical part of the strategy was in fact to
get on the front foot. So by the time the program went to air
we'd already had the written stuff prepared. Tony [Lauer,
the Police Commissioner] knew what he was going to say.
We had approached the media channels before the program
even went to air, so that at 7 a.m. the next morning he's on
Alan Jones, and then he's on John Laws and then he's on
Andrew OUe, etc.[radio talk shows]. In other words, get out
there first, don't sit back and wait for the questions. And
then he did lana Wendt and whatever [television
interviews]. You don't take them all on, you pick the ones
that you think will have the maximum exposure. You make
sure you're well briefed about the issues and generally
you're open about it. In other words, if there's criticism
there, you accept it if it's right - not everything ... So part
of that is about stressing the positive but accepting that
there are things to do and trying to identify what those
issues are. (A senior administrative officer).
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A proacti ve approach meant that instead of being on the defensive, the
police organisation was seen to be already doing something about the
problem. The front-page headline of the Sydney Morning Herald read, for
example, 'Police shake-up over TV racism' (8MB 6 March 1992). The
message was unequivocal that the racist behaviour was unacceptable, and
something was being done. Deviance was portrayed as 'individual and
incidental' and located at the lower ranks of the organisation (cf Punch
1985: 152), while senior management was presented as being clearly in
control:
• An internal investigation had been ordered by the Commissioner
into the conduct of 140 officers stationed at Redfern
• The Commissioner was 'dismayed' by the behaviour of some of the
officers, but was 'confident their attitudes did not reflect those of
the overwhelming majority in the force'
• The transfer or dismissal of some officers was one of the options
being considered
The Assistant Commissioner in charge of Training and Recruitment
supplied the positive news of the Police Service's achievements in recent
years in terms of improved training and standards (5MB 'No excuses: police
training chief', 6 March 1992):
• New recruits were better educated (13 per cent were university
graduates; average HSC mark of 343), older (average age 25
compared with 21 or 22 a few years ago); with 31 per cent of the
class being women
• New instruction methods were introduced last year to train recruits
to handle different situations
• Future graduates would be stationed at 'demonstration' patrols
which emphasise teaching_
• There were 161 Aborigines in the police service; 32 were
Aboriginal liaison officers
• Bridging programmes were set up in conjunction with the TAPE
college for Aborigines to improve their educational standards to
qualify for recruitment into the police service
• Members of other ethnic minority groups were also being recruited
There was, of course, still a lot of bad news on the same pages.
Police/Aborigines relations were still tense, with a spokesman for the
Aboriginal Legal Service and a local activist both claiming that 'nothing had
changed' because 'police still regarded Aborigines as the enemy' (5MB
'Harassment increasing, say Aborigines', 6 March 1992).
Critics of the police were not impressed by the slickness of the media
campaign, although the thoughtful ones did appreciate the enormity of the
problem and the fact that the organisation was genuinely trying:
\
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[Police Commissioner] Tony Lauer talks about how we've
made great strides in this and great strides in that - and he's
a terrific publicist ... he articulates very well, but it's all
fairy tale. I mean, he believes what he's saying and he's got
procedures in place but it takes a long time and you know
you go forward two steps and something happens and they
go back five sometimes. And I mean his responses to Cop
It Sweet were very clear and not bad press but I don't think
it convinced anybody. ... I watched Cop It Sweet for
instance ... I mean, it was exactly what I expected, you
know, what's new? It was only revealing to people that
don't know the area. And so to say it's isolated - he's just
fooling himself and he believes it. And, you know, the
changes just aren't any great leaps in these things. I mean,
if they work on it and work on it and work on it - no, they
just don't really consult enough. They don't really go for
resources to help them outside their own, which is crazy ...
But in fairness there are some areas where [community
liaison] is working very well ... For instance they've
increased the input in college for liaison officers and
Aboriginal police. I think they really are sincerely trying to
do it.
The media coverage which followed in the next few days focused on
various issues such as the injustices of the offensive language provisions of
the Summary Offences Act-{NSW) which 'gave police an open ticket to arrest
Aboriginal people' (8MB, 'Language law may be ajoke - but not for blacks',
7 March 1992); the futility of scape-goating the inexperienced police officers
portrayed in the film (8MH Letter 10 March 1992); the increased rate of
detention of Aborigines in prisons and the lack of progress in the
implementation of the recommendations of the Royal Commission into
Black Deaths in Custody (Sun-Herald, 'Black deaths inquiry a waste of time,
money', 8 March 1992).
What the NSW Police was not prepared for, however, was a second
bombshell in a week: the screening on ABC television news clips from an
amateur video, showing two NSW police officers with their skin painted
black and nooses around their necks, mocking two Aborigines whose death
had been the subject of investigation by the Royal Commission into
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. The tape was made in 1989 at a police fundraising party in Eromanga, a town in Queensland. This time the outcry was
led by the Prime Minister Paul Keating, who called the video 'sickening' and
said that the officers' behaviour 'brings disgrace on themselves, on their
police force and on Australia' (SMB 'National disgrace: the ugly faces of
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Australian racism', 13 March 1992). Again the Police Commissioner
ordered an inquiry. The two officers were placed on restricted duties and the
Commissioner offered an 'unreserved apology' to the family and friends of
the dead Aborigines, Lloyd Boney and David Gundy. The Commissioner's
Office issued a statement to the media which, apart from offering apologies
and expressing disappointment, attempted to broaden the focus of the debate
from the police to the wider Australian society:
•... We readily acknowledge there are problems between
the police and the Koori community.'
'But when one considers that the NSW Police, in line with
Government policies of the day, were forcibly removing
Koori children from their mothers as late as the 1960s, one
can start to fathom the extent of the historical friction
between both camps ~ .. '
'1 remain firm in my belief that the problems confronting
the Koori people go well past the police and into areas of
health, unemployment, alcohol abuse, housing and
education~,
'Of course, the ABC footage reflects badly on police, but it
also shows up the depth of a wider community malaise.'
'The actions of these few officers mirror a broader social
problem and this episode is a shocking and stark indictment
on the attitudinal ambivalence many of us feel.' (Police
Service Weekly 23 March 1992:3).
This broader view was also taken by both the Prime Minister who put the
onus on white Australians to change their attitudes towards Aborigines, and
the Aboriginal Deaths in Custody royal commissioner Hal Wootten, who
saw it as a reflection of the deep-seated racism in Australian society (SMB
'National disgrace: the ugly faces of Australian racism' 13 March 1992).
\

ORGAt4ISATIONAL REACTION AND
REPAIR
Reaction
Within the police organisation, there were mixed reactions to the
incidents and opinions as to where the blame should be laid. After the initial
shock and disbelief, members of the organisation began to distance
themselves from the negative picture that was painted. Distancing consists of
condemnation, denial and criticising the messenger. Many rank-and-file
police officers openly condemned the racist language and unprofessional
practices of those portrayed in the documentary. An executive of the Police
Association explained:
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The interesting statewide response was that the police at
Redfern were subjected to a level of abuse and, I guess,
rejection that I have never experienced in my twenty odd
years of policing. And that the general view was that the
behaviour of the Redfern police was not only seen as being
unacceptable but it caused great discomfort to police
generally throughout New South Wales . .. It was
interesting in talking with some 80 police at Redfern that
the thing that they objected to most of all was the fact that
they had been rejected by their own peers. Some would
suggest that that was significant in tenns of the police
culture - that is that for the first time we've seen what I call
the great body of police publicly rejecting the behaviour of
a group at Redfern ... There was a whole range of
responses '" [The Police Association] received a lot of
telephone calls which were in the main very offensive ...
Redfern itself received a tremendous number [of calls] from
police throughout the State. Again many of them from irate
police officers very upset, very offensive. Then there were
a range of responses in the press, letters to the editor where
police identified themselves and were attempting to
distance themselves from ... what they call the 'Redfern
element' .

The culture of secrecy and solidarity among police officers may have
been partly broken at a time of crisis, but several letters to the Police
Association's 'official journal' regarding Cop It Sweet presented some
dissenting views. One letter condemned those who criticised the Redfern
police as acting out of 'mindless self-interest' which threatened to destroy
camaraderie among police officers:
This letter is ... about and directed to all those persons,
police or otherwise who have had the gall to ring Redfern
Station to register their self righteous indignation about the
police and their behaviour in that programme. Who the hell
do they think they are? I've even seen letters to the editor in
a Sydney newspaper from police officers in which their
holier than thou drivel is espoused. Stand and be counted how many of you have submitted your green fonn to
relocate to Redfern and to volunteer to work a night shift on
Redfern One. '" let's think twice before jumping on a bandwagon; camaraderie amongst police does not mean
conspiracy - it means comradeship and good fellowship;
qualities, I fear we are in danger of losing to that of
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mindless self-interest....(A police sergeant, NSW Police
News April 1992:35).
Another letter reinforced stereotypes of Aborigines and attempted to
justify police practices by laying the blame on Aborigines themselves:

To our branch this show depicted that it is the Aborigines
who are racist when it comes to police. The Aborigine
arrested for indecent language showed this openly when he
swore at the sergeant declaring by what right he had to dare
to enter an Aborigine area and to get out immediately hence the language ... If police are inclined to be racist, and
I am not suggesting that they are, then the Aborigines have
given them plenty of cause to take this view. As well as
committing plenty of offences against the law, they often
show open animosity against police especially when
drinking - which is often. In my own experience, for many
years I had a lot to do with Aborigines. In those days the
Aborigine Protection Act was in force, which in part
prohibited them from' drinking intoxicating liquor. I can
assure you that the Aborigine of the 50's was a much
happier and peace~l person than he is today - there being a
few exceptions of course. The day the Government accepts
the fact that intoxicating liquor is one of the main problems
of Aborigines the sooner relations between Aborigines and
whites, especially Police, will improve ... (Secretary of an
organisation of retired police officers, NSW Police News,
June 1992:45-46).

Many within the police organisation saw Cop It Sweet as unbalanced and
unrepresentative, thus denying that there was a systemic problem. Some of
the comments from senior police were concerned with the lack of balance
and questioned the professional judgment of the documentary producer:
I was concerned. I don't believe that it was a balanced
presentation. For example, I had two of the Aboriginal
'~iaison Officers from Redfern here yesterday and I asked
them were they interviewed by the ABC journalists and
they said - and they nodded and I said I didn't see you in the
programme and they said, well, they didn't like what we
said ... I think they were out to tell the story they wanted to
tell. I really think they went in there with a preconceived
idea of what police and Aboriginal relations was all about
and that's how they presented eventually. It doesn't justify
what I saw recorded, I'm not seeking to do that. (A senior
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police executive)
The programme Cop It Sweet ... was I think far from a
balanced programme. It was in my view quite boring
television, an attempt to copy the American Cops type
programme, but we don't have the same kind of activity
here that keeps it interesting ... That crew spent six weeks
at Redfern Police Station, the first three weeks they spent
insinuating themselves with the people so that they became
just part of the furniture and the second three weeks
filming. Now if you spent three weeks filming consistently
you would expect to have something more exciting. My
own suspicion is that they got a bit desperate - there wasn't
much dramatic happening and they put together what they
could. That doesn't detract from the fact that some of our
young officers were behaving in a manner that we, of which
we disapprove as an organisation, but I think it is a
reflection of community attitudes rather than specifically
police attitudes. (A senior administrative officer)
There are some police that I suppose are cowboys. That's
how I would refer to them and they would express their
views which would certainly not be reflective of all the
police within that Patrol. I know some police that are down
there that have done a lot of good work with Aboriginal
youth which wasn't portrayed - in relation to training,
education, even had some funding granted to them with
Cleveland High School where there was a school based
project running for $1,500 to get a scheme up and running.
It portrayed a lot of the negativity. I don~t think it was
reflective of the whole Patrol. (A senior police officer).
In fact, the organisation was in the middle of another 'repair' job when
Cop It Sweet went to air. During the previous year, the Human Rights and
Equal Opportunities Commission (HREOC)'s National Inquiry into Racist
Violence had come out in strong condemnation of Australian police forces as
the main perpetrators of racist violence against Aborigines (HREOC 1991).
In spite of the fact that the National Inquiry made use of a variety of
infonnation sources, one consistent reaction to the Report on Racist Violence
within the New South Wales Police Service was that the research was
methodologically flawed. One officer remarked about the Inquiry's study of
police treatment of Aboriginal juveniles:
... you realise that all the people they interviewed were
offenders, don't you? I'm not saying it's not possible; it
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could have happened, but bear in mind that they're
allegations. Bear in mind they are the criminals. They've all
got an axe to grind if you like ... I think the general
consensus is that the report is exaggerated and not a true
picture. Because I think police are extremely careful about
what they do with Aborigines because of all the flak
they've received. There's also a high degree of provocation
that goes on ... How do you cope with it? And we have
young police who go to, some of them go to Walgett
wanting to do the right thing. They've been educated and
taught to be sensitive and they go there and they confront
50% of the population that is abusive and violent and
aggressive. I mean, what is that going to do to anybody? (A
civilian officer)
This also echoed the general criticism by the police of an earlier Human
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission report on the Redfern raid in
1990 (Cunneen 1990). As a newspaper editorial pointed out in that case:
Instead of answering the most telling of the specific
criticisms of the raid,. [Police Commissioner] Mr Avery has
attacked the report for its lack of balance. In particular, he
says, it failed to take proper account of 'the operational
constraints and responsibilities placed on police in the
[Redfern] area' and 'the positive initiatives undertaken by
police to seek to improve the quality of life in Redfern.' ...
Mr Avery's response will not do. A strong criticism
emerging from the Human Rights Commission report is
that positive policies, however imaginative and sincerely
applied, can be thoroughly undermined by one single
misguided policy such as the resort to the heavy-handed
methods characteristic of the Tactical Response Group.
(SMH Editorial 'the police role in Redfern', 24 May 1990)
The Rac;ist Violence report took the police organisation by surprise. They
did not think that the police would be singled out as the prime perpetrators
of racist violence. Even though the Inquiry did not place the blame on any
one police force in Australia, one member of the NSW Police objected to the
scapegoating of the police by the Inquiry:
The major concern was that by having what was seen as a
heavy police focus, that there's wider systematic problems
that clearly impacted on or influenced the relationship
between the police and minority groupings. It was argued
the report did a disservice in failing to recognise that many
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other government agencies had failed to accept their
responsibility and that ultimately the problems, which
should have been shared not only within the agencies and
bureaucracies but within communities, were in fact being
sheeted home to police. (A police officer).
The frustration felt by those who have been the 'refooners' within the
police force was evident in the following account by a member of the police
organisation who attempted to establish a dialogue with the critics regarding
the issue of overpolicing:
Overpolicing was one of the major criticisms of the report
... I got up at [a conference run by the Institute of
Criminology] - there was a good roll up at the conference,
great roll up. All the converted - there was no one there who
had a different point of view to the mass point of view. I sat
there and listened to speaker after speaker dump on the
coppers and I thought, no, it's a bit more serious than that,
there's more going on than just dumping on the police and
so I got up and tried to take them to task on the issue of
overpolicing by suggesting that the police patrols they had
nominated as being heavily overpoliced were in fact
overpoliced - on a simple system of ratio of police to
population, they were way overpoliced, but if that was the
only criteria they were going to use to judge whether
they're overpoliced or not, they missed the point, because
the way the government responds - and by that I mean the
electorate at large and individual government agencies - is
to depend upon the police agency to keep the lid on these
communities ... and the way we staff towns like that is on
a workload basis. So that the more reports of crimes you get
the more police you get. It's a sort of vicious cycle and in
lieu of any other agency doing anything constructive, what
you do is you find you get more and more police because
the communities - the downward spiral of disintegration
that takes place in these communities because of poverty,
unemployment, alcoholism, and consequentially, domestic
violence, child abuse, bad health and hygiene, all those
issues manifest themselves in crime and none of the other
agencies pick the tab up. And what the government does is
ask the coppers to pick the tab up. That issue of
overpolicing I was trying to say to this conference is a very .
complex issue ... and the response I got from the audience
was one of derision.
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The organisational response to the Racist Violence report was, according
to one officer, to not take it seriously. The official response was that 'Staffing
levels will be increased in patrols with high Aboriginal and non..Englishspeaking populations and police officers will be warned that racist violence
will not be tolerated' (SMH 'Police act on racist violence inquiry', 27/5/91).
It took the commitment of a few members to make sure that the organisation
did not simply sweep everything under the carpet:
I suppose at the end of the day there are some individuals in
here who are serious about improving the quality of service
to minority communities, but the organisation as a whole
doesn't give a shit about it. This gets me back to our typical
bureaucratic response to this report. We didn't take it
seriously when it was happening, then there was the media
circus with the likes of [name of journalist] talking about
individual allegations of racist behaviours and that, we then
thought we'd better do something so we responded again
with some releases ... then it stopped there - stopped dead.
And that's where the whole show would have stopped,
right, and I'm sure in any. other organisation that's where it
has stopped. It's gone absolutely no further. What happened
here was a few people, [names of people] ... decided that
we needed to pick up the ball and run with it. So, in any
organisation you're dependent on some ratbags doing
something about it, so we picked it up and said, well, we
need to set up a mechanism internally that's going to take it
seriously, and is going to respond to it and that's where we
set up our Working Party on the report '" What we tried to
do was to involve operational police ... in working up our
response to the recommendations.
The Working Party met over twelve months and came up with additional
recommendations to deal with structural obstacles to combatting racism. A
status report was made to the Commissioner and an implementation schedule
was developed:The final recommendations went to the different commands
for comments. Meanwhile, Cop It Sweet carne along and the Commissioner
established another working group to advise him on what action thight be
taken by the organisation in response.

Repair
Opinions varied within the police organisation regarding what went
wrong with Redfern and one of the most frequently raised criticism was the
quality of supervision:
If you're looking at Redfern, ... the reality is that -
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notwithstanding the Redfern film was a one-hour clip of six
or eight weeks - the behavioural characteristics must have
been known - in my view '" to the patrol command. I
can't see how that could have been avoided. If you were to
come in here and tell me certain things occurred last night
and they occurred to certain people, I might say we might
have expected it, we thought we had it under control, we'd
missed, but I just don't see how it could not have been
known and that poses some questions. At the same time,
bearing in mind the experience of Operation Sue nine or
twelve months earlier, you must query the role of the
District Commander I would have thought ... The reality is
that the behaviour was so open that it's very hard to say that
people didn't know it was going on and it's very hard to say
that, whilst you may not have fully agreed with it, there was
obviously no one totally opposed to it .
Another diagnosis was the gap between training and practice - Redfern
was a difficult patrol to work in and police training did not adequately
prepare officers for the type of work they had to engage in. One constable
explained:
I found that Redfern is a place that's extremely difficult to
police. It's extremely hard. The incidence of crime is not
petty ... The huge housing commission complexes and the
high density of population in a small area creates a lot of
difficulty. Alcohol's a really visible problem in the area,
maybe more so with Aboriginal people than white people
... Why it's difficult to police is because you're making
important decisions quickly and often Redfern police have
a high workload so they're constantly going from one job to
another - at whatever age level they are or whatever
amount of experience of policing that they have - flying
by the seat of their pants ... Redfern police are dealing with
difficult situations maybe three or four or five times a day
. .. What that woman says on the film when she says the
Academy is 'bullshit' ... she's saying that we have to make
split decisions, we had to make them quickly and the
Academy doesn't teach us this.
As a result of the scandal, a review of the quality and effectiveness of
cross-cultural training was undertaken. Cop It Sweet was to be incorporated
into a video for police training and a senior lecturer in multicultural studies
was appointed to the Police Academy.
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Some officers attempted to broaden the organisational response to the
documentary away from simply improving supervisory practices and police
training, towards assisting local police to develop meaningful strategies and
consultation with the Aboriginal communities. One officer proposed that a
proper debriefing session should be conducted with all the police officers
working at Redfern to allow officers to reflect on the problems and
collectively come up with some plan of action to improve the situation.
Another proposed a comprehensive programme of consultation with the
Aboriginal community in Redfern. These ideas were not immediately
adopted by the police executives. One officer tried to establish a consultation
mechanism through the Police Association (SMH, 'New force to tackle
Aboriginal friction' 17 March 1992), but his effort was met with scepticism
from the community and obstruction from the association.
A frustrated officer thought that once again the police organisation gave
up an opportunity to do something substantial about the problem:
We've had the wi!ldow open up before, you know,
Operation Sue gave us an opportunity to do something. The
National Inquiry report gave us an opportunity to do
something. There've been lots of individual instances
where we could have taken opportunities to improve our
game. This one absolutely shattered the window and we've
got this huge opportunity to do something. What do we do?
Bring in the repair people and whack up a bit of four by two
so no one can get in. Basically that's where we are; we're
hoping it will go away ... Nothing's changed, absolutely
nothing has changed. We'll wait for the next disaster in
Redfern and we'll go into this cycle again ... So, you know,
we're really back to the situation ... [where] we're not
taking it seriously. I'm not even sure if it's we're not taking
it seriously, or we don't understand the issues. That's where
up at the senior executive level, we must hope it'll go away
again and we'll weather the next storm. And I don't think
it's really conscious on people's part. I think they want
people to do the right thing. They hope that we give a good
service to Aboriginal people or people from ethnic
minorities, but you're dealing with the general population
in the Police Service with all the prejudice and nothing
happens easily. It's all a lot of work, a lot of commitment.
It takes a lot of commitment and a good understanding of
all the underlying issues and it's not really there at present.
One example of senior police not understanding the underlying issue was
given in relation to what was said at a meeting:
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One guy said to me in our ... meeting ... he said there's so
many recommendations going, you don't change these
people - talking about the Aboriginal people - 200 years
they've been like this, you're not going to change them, and
I said to him, we're not trying to change them, it's us we're
trying to change - he sort of missed the point.
The organisation's public show of openness and emphasis on the positive
did not prevent an internal 'witch hunt' from being conducted. Questions
were asked about who had allowed the filming to take place, what
procedures had or had not been followed, and how the organisation could
ensure that it never happened again (Brockie 1994: 179). An officer who took
an active part in pushing for change had mixed feelings about the initial
outcomes:
What Cop It Sweet did do, it raised the level of debate
within communities within this nation to the point where
there was, as I saw it, a collective responsibility coming to
the fore, where for the first time the issue in debate didn't
centre exclusively on policing. I also believe Cop It Sweet
has been instrumental in forcing a government response to
the Commission on Black Deaths in Custody.
Unfortunately, it appears that from a Police Service
viewpoint, their only understanding of Cop It Sweet was to
see it strictly in terms of unacceptable behaviour of a fewthe perception that there was a clear lack of supervision and
I've seen no evidence to suggest that anything meaningful
will in fact come from the Police Service to address what I
see are the wider issues. In fact what I saw from the Police
Service response was to justify police education and
training, was to reject the behaviour and basically to call on
our Internal Affairs people to conduct a fairly close
investigation to identify those constables and sergeants who
were either directly seen in the film as behaving
unacceptably or were ultimately found to have some level
of responsibility in terms of supervision.
It was not until a year later that some of the consequences of the
organisational responses to Cop It Sweet and the 'bad taste' video became
apparent. In April 1992, the Commissioner announced that 13 officers whose
behaviours were broadcast in Cop It Sweet and the amateur video were to be
subject to disciplinary action. The two former Bourke police officers
featured in the amateur video were to be transferred and closely supervised
for two years. They were also to be paraded and counselled by the State
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Commander and required to attend 'an educational course designed to
encourage empathy and understanding with ethnic and minority groups'.
One constable at Redfern received a disciplinary transfer and would be
directly supervised. Other police ranging from Probationary Constables to an
Inspector were to be paraded andlor counselled. The Commissioner justified
the disciplinary action as reflecting a 'problem-solving' approach meant to
'impact positively on long-term attitudinal and cultural change', since little
benefit could be gained by 'banishing' these officers, who 'have already
been widely criticised and ridiculed in the public arena and within the ranks
of their own profession' (Police Service Weekly 11 May 1992:13). The NSW
Aboriginal Legal Service and the widow of David Gundy were reported to
be outraged at the leniency of the punislunent (SMH, 'Anger over transfer of
racist police', 25 April 1992).
Subsequent developments prompted a previously sceptical member of
the organisation to comment on the positive effect of Cop It Sweet, 'We need
a Cop It Sweet every week~. The positive de~elopments include an 'historic'
meeting between a group of Aboriginal elders and senior police, including
the Commissioner, in May 1992. The meeting was 'part of a consultation
process the Commissioner is undertaking to improve the relationship
between Police and the Aborigines' (Police Service Weekly~ 15 June 1992:
31). The State Commander also visited various centres in the North West
area and met with both the police and the local Aboriginal communities. In
October 1992, a two-day forum attended by senior police and Aboriginal
leaders from around the State considered a draft Police Aboriginal Policy
Statement and the fonnation of a Police Aboriginal Council. The Policy
Statement was subsequently launched in December - a significant event in
the history of police!Aborigines relations in New South Wales, since such a
policy statement had not existed until then, although an Ethnic Affairs Policy
Statement relating to people of non-English speaking background had been
developed since 1988. What was more significant, however, was the fact that
the statement was developed through extensive consultation with the
Aboriginal community. In this statement, the NSW Police Service 'is
committed to providing a service to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people, which is appropriate to their needs and free from racism and other
forms of discrimination'. Furthennore,
Appropriateness will be determined through a
comprehensive and ongoing process of consultation. This
consultation will involve the general Aboriginal
community, including Aboriginal people who have come
under police notice.
A Strategic Plan was to be developed and monitored by the Police
Aboriginal Council and the Policy Statement was to be evaluated every
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twelve months by the Council, and 'changes considered necessary by
Aboriginal people will be considered by the Council'.
In a 1993 speech on police accountability, the Commissioner expressed
his belief that police organisations should not give in to the 'natural desire to
retreat when under attack or scrutiny' :
Some have made the analogy of a police organisation being
much like a turtle. If it is bashed about, the turtle simply
sucks its head, arms and legs into its shell ... and it doesn't
matter how hard or ferociously you bang on top, it remains
tucked away from public glare. The turtle-like temptation
must be resisted (Lauer 1994:65).
Ironically, being more accountable meant being more open and
accessible to outside scrutiny. This in tum could lead to more damage to the
organisation.
Some senior officers within the police organisation thought that the
succession of adverse media coverage in recent years was not the result of
any deterioration of the quality of police work; rather, it reflected a more
mature, more open and a more accountable police organisation:
The impression often held by politicians and the
community is the police stuff up more now than they used
to. My view is completely the opposite. I think that in the
old days we covered them up ... And I think that, if you
like, the price of being_a more accountable organisation is
more visibility and I think that it's desirable
I think we
stuff up less but we hear a lot more about it
In the old
days we basically said nothing, said 'no comment' and did
no preparation, put our heads down and copped it. Now ...
it's certainly more sophisticated in terms of being more
open-minded for a start, recognising we make mistakes or
continue to make mistakes, and that's particularly more so
now when you're trying to change things. You always make
more mistakes when you introduce some of these
substantial changes as we have in the past 5 or 6 years.
The lesson of Cop It Sweet appeared to be that openness was to be a
virtue of the higher rather than the lower levels of the organisation.
While the Commissioner allowed the ABC programme The 7:30 Report
to follow him around from morning till night for a week, Jenny Brockie was
allowed only limited filming of the police 'under the tightest supervision' for
her subsequent documentary on the Campbelltown Local Court (Brockie
1994:179).
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POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY AND

THE MEDIA
The accountability of police has been an issue much debated by both
practitioners and academics in recent years. In general, accountability refers
to the 4institutional arrangements made to ensure that police do the job
required of them', but there is considerable disagreement regarding which
should be regarded as the appropriate institutions to which police are
accountable (Brogden et al 1988:151). Certainly, police are supposed to be
accountable to the law: illegal activities are punishable by criminal law,
while other failures to perfonn their duties properly may be dealt with by
civil remedies or disciplinary procedures. Police regulations or codes of
practice, criminal and civil courts, administrative review tribunals and
citizen complaints procedures are instruments of accountability available to
the general public. More recently, however, there is increasing recognition
that police should also be subject to democratic political control, since law
enforcement policy is more than a neutral legal decision but a political
choice (Brogden et al 1988:161; Lustgarten 1986). Goldring and Blazey
(1994) have argued that police in Australia should be subject to the same
mechanisms of accountability as other public sector employees:
Public officials who have discretionary powers ... are in
general, accountable for the way they exercise those
powers. They are accountable to their departmental
superiors, in hierarchical systems. They are accountable
financially, through the audit systems. They are accountable
to the Ombudsman and to the courts for their
administration. They are accountable in many ways under
the managerial techniques which have now become part of
public sector administration ... It should be assumed that in
a democratic society police services and individual police
officers are subject to the democratic control of the
Parliament (Goldring and Blazey 1994:27-28).
"-

The role of the media as one of the mechanisms of accountability is
seldom discussed in the literature (Skolnick 1994), although the participation
of the news media in exposing police corruption is well known (Shennan
1978). It may be argued that in the case of Cop It Sweet, the media had
succeeded in securing accountability where the hierarchical structure, the
audit systems, the Ombudsman, the courts, the managerial techniques and
the democratic process had failed. The documentary and subsequent media
coverage had revealed, publicised and helped dramatise the problem of
police race relations, so that police executives were forced to defend the
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organisation (cf Sherman 1978). Just as police bureaucracies demand routine
giving and taking of accounts between subordinates and supervisors, media
scandals require police executives to provide credible accounts to
demonstrate that they are in control of their organisation and that appropriate
actions are being taken to rectify the problems.
The power of the media should not, however, be overstated. Police
organisations have two choices when confronted with adverse publicity.
They could retreat into their shell as Commissioner Lauer mentioned, or they
could try to control the damage by proactively engaging in the negotiation of
the public discourse. Increasingly, the latter strategy is found to be more
effective in protecting organisations from further adverse publicity and
allowing them to steer public debates in a less damaging direction. The
ultimate success of a scandal in effecting change depends critically on the
extent to which the organisation is willing and able to take seriously its
responsibility to be publicly accountable. As Braithwaite and Fisse (1987)
find in their research on the control of corporate crime:
... companies with little will to comply sometimes draw
lines of accountability with a view to creating a picture of
diffused responsibility so that no one can be caIIed to
account should a court look into the affairs of the company.
Everyone is given a credible alibi for blaming someone else
... (Braithwaite and Fisse 1987: 227).
The willingnes~of the New South Wales Police Service to
take accountability seriously was demonstrated by the
actions and policies which emerged from the aftermath of
Cop It Sweet. Its ability to take accountability seriously was
the result of years of reform which have begun to change
the police culture at least at the upper management level.
Although senior management did try to portray the
problems as individual and incidental, as well as being
located at the lower levels, and there was a tendency for
scapegoating and conducting 'witch hunts', these were
accompanied by a serious attempt to consult with
Aboriginal communities and improve police training. In
fact, many of the initiatives announced as corrective
measures had been planned and developed before the
scandal. Cop It Sweet provided reformers within the
organisation with powerful ammunition to push for further
changes - it was a catalyst for implementing the necessary
reforms. Instead of activating inter-rank hostilities and
unleashing a war of resistance by the lower ranks against
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managerial control (see Punch 1975: Chapter 6), the
scandal led to a fairly widespread condemnation of racism
among police officers, a recognition of the deficiencies in
training and supervision, and a renewed commitment by the
police organisation to further reforms. There was also
increasing awareness in the community that police racism
could not be successfully dealt with until racism in the
wider society had been confronted.
The positive outcomes of the Cop It Sweet scandal, however, should not
obscure the possibility that deviant police practices may well persist in spite
of the refonus. Sherman (1978: 263) has suggested that scandal is not
sufficient for refonning a deviant police organisation; ultimately police
organisations must be able to control themselves. Given that some senior
officers still resorted to witch hunts and scapegoating as methods of exerting
control, and that media access to the police organisation had since been
curtailed in spite of the Commissioner's pledge for the organisation to be
more open and accountable, the temptation to cany out piecemeal and
cosmetic repair work rather than meaningful change would remain strong. In
spite of years of. a,pparently radical refanus, the public image of the NSW
Police Service has been marred'in recent years by some high-profile cases of
blundering, incompetence and unprofessional activities (Wootten Report
1991; Lee Report 1990; Landa Report 1991; Staunton Report 1991).
Opponents of reform saw these as evidence that many of the initiatives were
ill-conceived and that the pace of change was too rapid. The irony of police
refoon is that a commitment to openness and accountability does not
necessarily lead to a positive police image, but continual damage-control
work by upper management in relation to scandals may lead to further
cynicism and a hardening of the 'street cop' culture.
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